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A B S T R A C T
Two great trends are evident in the evolution of life on Earth: towards increasing diversiﬁcation and
towards increasing integration. Diversiﬁcation has spread living processes across the planet,
progressively increasing the range of environments and free energy sources exploited by life. Integration
has proceeded through a stepwise process in which living entities at one level are integrated into
cooperative groups that become larger-scale entities at the next level, and so on, producing cooperative
organizations of increasing scale (for example, cooperative groups of simple cells gave rise to the more
complex eukaryote cells, groups of these gave rise to multi-cellular organisms, and cooperative groups of
these organisms produced animal societies). The trend towards increasing integration has continued
during human evolution with the progressive increase in the scale of human groups and societies. The
trends towards increasing diversiﬁcation and integration are both driven by selection. An understanding
of the trajectory and causal drivers of the trends suggests that they are likely to culminate in the
emergence of a global entity. This entity would emerge from the integration of the living processes,
matter, energy and technology of the planet into a global cooperative organization. Such an integration of
the results of previous diversiﬁcations would enable the global entity to exploit the widest possible
range of resources across the varied circumstances of the planet. This paper demonstrates that it's case
for directionality meets the tests and criticisms that have proven fatal to previous claims for
directionality in evolution.
ã 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd.
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Is there an overall direction to evolution that is driven by
selection? Do evolutionary processes drive the evolution of life in a
particular direction? Is evolution headed somewhere?
Various attempts have been made to answer these questions by
demonstrating the existence of large-scale directional patterns in
evolution. None have yet attracted widespread acceptance.
The hypothesis that seems to have gained most support is that
selection tends to drive increasing complexity as evolution
proceeds (see McShea, 1991 for an overview). Intuitively, this
seems to be a plausible claim. There are many instances of
increases in complexity during the evolution of life on Earth.
However, strong arguments have been mounted against the claim
that this apparent trend is driven by selection that directly favours
increased complexity (Gould, 1996; McShea, 1991, 1994, 1996).
In particular, it is obvious that complexity per se is not favoured
by selection. There are numerous possible changes in organisms* Tel.: +61 3 96637959/422540984.
E-mail address: future.evolution@gmail.com (J.E. Stewart).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.biosystems.2014.05.006
0303-2647/ã 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ireland Ltd. This is an open accethat would increase complexity but are not advantageous in
evolutionary terms. And changes that are less complex are not
always inferior.
Compounding this difﬁculty, proponents of this claim have
been unable to identify how known evolutionary processes would
drive the supposed trend towards increasing complexity. This is a
serious deﬁciency that also bedevils other attempts to demon-
strate an overall, driven trend in evolution. To demonstrate such a
trend, it is not sufﬁcient to identify some supposed large-scale
pattern in evolution and to marshal empirical evidence that
substantiates the existence of the pattern. The pattern may be an
artefact and not driven by selection that directly favours the
pattern. It is therefore also necessary to provide the claimed
directionality with micro-foundations at the level of natural
selection that show how the pattern is driven by selection and
related processes.
This has proven particularly challenging because it is not at all
obvious how natural selection could drive a trajectory encompass-
ing all living processes, given that it produces only local adaptation
to local circumstances (Gould, 1996; Maynard Smith, 1988).
This deﬁciency obviously cannot be overcome by the postula-
tion of some new general ‘force’, ‘tendency’ or ‘drive’ that isss article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/).
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overcome by teleological explanations that rely on impermissible
‘pulls from the future’.
The weakness of the ‘complexity’ hypothesis is not only due to
the absence of a convincing micro-foundational model that
demonstrates how accepted evolutionary processes drive in-
creased complexity. It has been further undermined by the
demonstrations that show how the apparent pattern of increasing
complexity could emerge passively – i.e. that show how
complexity could increase without it being actively favoured by
selection in any overall sense.
Gould (1996, 1988) and McShea (1994) have shown that
complexity would be expected to increase as evolution unfolds
merely as a consequence of the fact that the ﬁrst living processes
were necessarily simple. Life had nowhere else to go but to become
more complex. Evolution necessarily began with the exploration of
the possibility space which encompasses simple forms of life. It
necessarily continued after that with the progressive exploration
of the possibility space for living processes of greater and greater
complexity. So as evolution proceeded, more complex forms of life
emerged progressively, giving the appearance of a trend. Because
life began as simply as possible, there was no countervailing
exploration of more simple forms.
This model facilitates the identiﬁcation of a key test for
distinguishing an overall trend that is driven from one that is
passive (in the sense that it is not driven directly by selection that
favours the trend). If the trend is passive and there is no overall
advantage to complexity, simpler organisms will not necessarily be
replaced as evolution proceeds. In contrast, if the trend is universal
and driven directly by selection, all organisms in all niches could be
expected to evolve in the direction of the trajectory, or be replaced
by others that do so. If complex organisms are favoured over the
less complex overall, simpler organisms cannot be expected to
continue to persist.
As Gould (1996) points out in detail, the complexity hypothesis
fails this critical test. Relativelysimple organisms such as bacteria are
still abundant. For extended periods of time, they have not increased
in complexity, nor have they been replaced by ones that have.
This test also proves fatal for other claims that evolution
exhibits an overall trajectory that is driven by selection that
directly favours the trend. These include claims that put humanity
at the tip of the evolutionary trajectory (see Ruse, 1996 for
examples). Such claims typically hypothesise that evolution
favours attributes that are most highly developed in humans
(e.g. intelligence, adaptability). The continued existence of huge
numbers of organisms that exhibit less-developed forms of these
attributes tends to suggest that they are not favoured in any overall
or universal sense by selection.
This paper presents a case fordirectionality in evolution that does
not suffer from the deﬁciencies that have undermined other claims.
It should be emphasized from the outset that the claim outlined
here is made in relation to the evolution of all living processes on
Earth, including humans and human organizations. As the paper
will demonstrate, the trajectory of evolution can only be properly
understood if the evolution of all living processes is taken into
account, ultimately as a whole. In particular, the full nature of the
trajectory cannot be identiﬁed and understood by focusing on, for
example, only biological evolution. As we shall see, human cultural
evolution and the evolution of human organisations and technol-
ogy (including artiﬁcial intelligence) play a critically important role
in driving the trajectory beyond a certain point. The nature of the
evolutionary mechanisms that explore possibility space prove to
be far less important in driving the trajectory than is the structure
of the possibility space. In particular, the trajectory is shaped
primarily by the nature and location of evolutionary attractors in
possibility space.Section 2 of the paper begins to outline the case for a particular
form of overall directionality. It identiﬁes a large-scale pattern that
is evident in the evolution of life on Earth.
Section 3 provides the pattern with micro-foundations by
presenting a model which demonstrates that this pattern is driven
by natural selection and other accepted evolutionary processes.
Section 4 subjects the model and its key predictions to
appropriate tests, including those that have been failed by other
claims for overall directionality.
Section 5 concludes the paper by providing an overview of the
trajectory of evolution and discussing some of its key implications.
2. A large-scale pattern
If we stand back from the evolution of life on Earth and view it
as a whole, a number of patterns are apparent.
2.1. Diversiﬁcation
An obvious trend is that living processes have diversiﬁed as
evolution proceeded. When life ﬁrst began on Earth, it was limited
to exploiting only a tiny proportion of available free energy sources
under a very restricted range of environmental conditions. From
there living processes have diversiﬁed progressively as evolution
unfolded, spreading across the planet, adapting to an ever-
widening range of environmental conditions and exploiting more
and more sources of free energy. This trend towards increasing
diversiﬁcation has continued up until the present with the
emergence of humans, albeit now mainly through the processes
of cultural evolution, rather than through gene-based adaptation
and speciation.
2.2. Integration into large-scale cooperative entities
But a less obvious trend that moves in a very different direction
is also apparent. As well as the trajectory towards increasing
diversiﬁcation, there is also a trend towards increasing integration.
As the evolution of life on Earth has unfolded, living processes have
increasingly come to be integrated into cooperative organizations
of larger and larger scale.
This has unfolded through a stepwise process. It began with the
integrationof self-reproducing molecular processes into cooperative
organizations that became the ﬁrst simple cells. These simple cells
adaptively radiated, exploiting fresh sources of free energy and
displacing proto-living processes from the sources they utilized.
But the process of integration did not end there. Cooperative
organizations of simple cells eventually formed the more complex
eukaryote cell (Margulis, 1981). Diversiﬁcation of eukaryote cells
by adaptive radiation was in turn followed by the integration of
some of these cells into larger-scale cooperatives, eventually
emerging as multi-cellular organisms. In a further repetition of this
process, cooperative organizations of multi-cellular organisms
produced animal societies.
This broad pattern in biological evolution has been described in
one form or another by a number of researchers, including Corning
(1983), Maynard Smith and Szathmáry (1995), Stewart (1995,
1997b, 2000), Turchin (1977) and Vidal (2014) (see Marcot and
McShea, 2007; McShea, 2001 for more historical detail). Often
different researchers have included different evolutionary events
and transitions in the patterns they describe. This is because the
causal factors that shape this pattern are as yet poorly understood.
Researchers have therefore lacked a sound basis for deciding which
particular evolutionary events fall within the pattern (e.g. see the
criticisms by McShea and Simpson (2011) of the classiﬁcation of
major evolutionary transitions developed by Maynard Smith and
Szathmáry (1995)).
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organizations of increasing scale is not limited to evolution driven
by gene-based natural selection. The trend has continued in human
evolution where cultural evolutionary processes now predomi-
nate: small kin groups were integrated into bands, bands were
integrated into tribes, these formed the constituents of kingdoms
and city states, and these in turn have been integrated into nation
states (Stewart, 2000; Turchin, 1977).
At each step in this process of integration, smaller-scale entities
are integrated into cooperative organizations that become larger-
scale entities at the next level of organization. Typically the larger-
scale entities undergo a relatively rapid diversiﬁcation and
adaptive radiation (e.g. see Knoll and Bambach, 2000). As evolution
unfolds, this step-wise process repeats itself, producing coopera-
tive organizations of living processes of greater and greater scale.
At each step, a new level of nesting of entities within larger-scale
entities arises. And as evolution proceeds, entities with greater
levels of nestedness emerge. The result is the familiar nested-
hierarchical structure of living processes. For example, a nation
such as the US is an organization of states which are in turn
organizations of local government entities, which are
in turn organizations of families and other small groups, which
are in turn organizations of individual humans, which are in turn
organizations of eukaryote cells, which in turn are organizations of
descendants of simpler prokaryote cells, and so on.
Because this process of integration has continued to repeat
itself, and because its products have out-competed some earlier
entities and also exploited fresh resources, an increasing propor-
tion of life on Earth has come to be integrated into cooperative
organizations as evolution has unfolded.
Like the trend towards diversiﬁcation, the trend towards
integration seems to be continuing apace at present. Humans
are increasingly integrating other living processes into
its organizations through activities such as farming, aquaculture
and broader ecosystem management. And human organization
itself seems likely to continue to increase in scale. Although
rudimentary, the League of Nations and the United Nations were
early attempts to build supra-national organizations on a global
scale. Some forms of economic organization are already global, and
regional cooperatives of nation states such as the European Union
have emerged. Global crises such as human-induced climate
change seem to be increasingly evoking coordinated responses
across nation states. The idea that some form of global governance
is essential for human survival and ﬂourishing is now strongly
supported by many leading international relations researchers
(e.g. see Craig, 2008) and economists (e.g. see Walker et al., 2009).
Since life began on Earth, this process of integration has
substantially increased the scale of cooperative organization. Three
thousand million years ago, cooperation extended only between
molecular processes that were separated by about a millionth of a
meter, the scale of early cells. Now, some forms of cooperation
extend between human organisms on the scale of the planet. Since
life began on Earth, the scale of cooperation between living
processes has increased by a factor of greater than 1013.
It seems possible that humans and other living processes will
increasingly be integratedinto a cooperative entityon the scale of the
planet (see Heylighen, 2007 for a history of ideas about a global
superorganism). If this occurs it will unite the two great trends in the
evolution of life on Earth, producing unity in diversity on the scale of
the planet, and maintaining that unity as entities within the global
entitycontinuetodifferentiateanddiversify(Stewart,1995,1997a,b).
3. What produces the pattern?
What is the nature of the apparent trend towards increasing
integration? Is it driven by selection that directly favours effectiveintegration, or is it largely passive? To what extent is the trend
produced and shaped by normal processes of evolution, such as
gene-based natural selection and cultural evolution?
I will set out to show that the apparent trend is shaped by two
major factors:
1) Cooperation between living entities can produce signiﬁcant
ﬁtness beneﬁts.
2) Despite these potential beneﬁts, cooperation does not evolve
easily (“the cooperation problem”). If a group of evolving
entities are to realize the potential beneﬁts of cooperation, a
complex and speciﬁc form of organization must ﬁrst arise
within the group.
3.1. The beneﬁts of cooperation
Thatcooperationcanproducesigniﬁcant ﬁtness advantages isnot
controversial (e.g. see Corning, 1983; Dugatkin, 1999; Miller, 1978;
Ridley, 1996; Stewart, 2000). Cooperative organizations have the
potential to be more successful than isolated individuals. Whatever
the evolutionary challenges, living processes can respond to them
more effectively if they form cooperative organizations and if their
actions are coordinated. In part this is because cooperation enables
the exploitation of synergies, including through specialization and
divisionoflabour(Corning,1983).Furthermore,thelargerthescaleof
anycooperativeorganization, themoreresourcesarecommandedby
it, the greater its power, the larger the impact and scale of its actions,
the greater the potential for collective adaptation and intelligence,
and therefore the wider the range of environmental challenges that
it can meet. Cooperation also saves resources that would otherwise
be dissipated by competition (e.g. it can eradicate much agonistic
behaviour, including waramongsthumans). Wherever impediments
to the evolution of cooperation have been overcome to some extent,
cooperation ﬂourishes (e.g. amongst the cells of multicellular
organisms, or amongst economic agents in an effective market for
goods and services (Knoll and Bambach, 2000)). The potential
beneﬁts of cooperation are a powerful driver at all levels of
organization, whether we are considering self-replicating molecular
processes, complex cells, organisms, corporations or nations.
It is evident that cooperation has the potential to produce
advantages for a great diversity of living entities in varied local
circumstances, irrespective of the nature of the mechanisms that
evolve or adapt them. The ways in which cooperation is able to
realize these advantages do not appear to be limited to any
particular kinds of entities or any particular environments.
3.2. The cooperation problem
But cooperation does not evolve easily (e.g. see Boyd and
Richerson, 2005; Buss, 1987; Olson, 1965; Williams, 1966). The
reasons for this are well understood. Consider a population of
living entities that compete for limited resources. Entities that
invest resources in beneﬁcial cooperation but fail to capture
sufﬁcient beneﬁts of that cooperation, will tend to be out-
competed. Other entities that take the beneﬁts of cooperation
without investing in the cooperation (free riders) will tend to do
better than co-operators. Free riders undermine the capacity of
co-operators to capture the beneﬁts created by their cooperation.
In these circumstances cooperation will not persist in the
population no matter how much its beneﬁts exceed its costs. This is
a very general impediment. It applies at all the levels of
organization, under whatever selective processes govern adapta-
tion at any particular level. It applies whether the interacting
entities are members of the same species or of different species.
And it also applies to entities that adapt through psychological or
other adaptive processes that have been shaped by selection. So it
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process, simple prokaryote cells, eukaryote cells, multicellular
organisms, the members of ecosystems, human tribes, human
economic entities (including corporations), and nation states.
If co-operators within a group of entities were able to capture
all the beneﬁts of their cooperation, cooperative organization
would self-organize (in more general terms, the cooperation
problem would be solved comprehensively if all the entities in a
group capture the impacts of their actions on the group as a whole,
whether the impacts are beneﬁcial or harmful) (Stewart, 2000).
Cooperation in which the beneﬁts to the individual exceed the
costs to the individual would be selected at the individual level
(unless some alternative, more effective cooperation emerged). If
this fundamental condition for cooperative self-organization were
met, individual entities that engage in cooperation would out-
compete non-co-operators. It would be in the evolutionary/
adaptive interests of individuals to cooperate. As a consequence,
the group would be able to explore the possibility space for
cooperative organization, and any form of cooperation that was
discovered and which was more advantageous would be able to
persist in the population. Where it was beneﬁcial, the kind of
complex division of labour that is found amongst the cells within
our bodies and amongst businesses in human economic systems
would self-organize.
3.3. Limited emergence of cooperation
But complex cooperative organization will not self-organize in
this way where the cooperation problem operates. Where the
problem applies, co-operators do not capture all the beneﬁts of
their cooperation because some leak to free-riders (and free-riders
do not capture the harmful effects they have on the group). In these
circumstances complex cooperative organization will not self-
organize, no matter what advantages it might provide to the group,
and no matter how strong any selection that favours it. Selection
cannot call cooperative organization into existence if that
organization cannot persist within the population.
Nevertheless, are there circumstances in which co-operators
can capture sufﬁcient of the beneﬁts of cooperation to enable some
simpler forms of cooperation to persist?
Co-operators will capture proportionately more of the beneﬁts
of cooperation if they interact cooperatively with other
co-operators more often than if all cooperative interactions are
random. This will ensure that the beneﬁts of cooperation are more
likely to be shared amongst co-operators than leak to free-riders. If
this condition is met, co-operators will capture a disproportionate
share of the beneﬁts of cooperation, and may capture sufﬁcient to
outweigh the costs of cooperation and the beneﬁts that ‘leak’ to
free riders. To the extent that this condition is met, co-operators
will be collectively autocatalytic (they will collectively facilitate
each other's success), and cooperative organization will be able to
persist and be a target of selection (Ulanowicz, 2009).
It is conceivable that this condition could be met stochastically
at times in a population. But it is likely to be met far more reliably if
the cooperative interactions within the population are biased in
some way. A huge literature has explored the speciﬁc kinds of
circumstances in which some form of cooperation can arise in a
population of competing entities (for overviews of particular parts
of this literature, see Nowak, 2006; Perc and Szolnoki, 2010;
Sigmund, 2010). In general, these circumstances can be understood
as particular instances where constraints or other sources of bias
increase the likelihood that co-operators interact cooperatively
with other co-operators. This will enable co-operators to increase
the proportion of cooperative beneﬁts they capture beyond their
representation in the population.Two main ways in which this bias can occur are:
1) Population structure: cooperative interactions may be biased
because the population of entities is structured in ways that
increase the likelihood that co-operators interact with other
co-operators. For example, low dispersal rates may concen-
trate co-operators and constrain the capacity of free riders to
move freely throughout the population and exploit local
concentrations of co-operators (e.g. entities might be ﬁxed to a
two dimensional surface for part of their life cycle (Nadell et al.,
2010), or offspring may stay close to their parents (Grifﬁn et al.,
2004; Hamilton, 1964)). Or the population may be formed into
groups that tend to concentrate co-operators and restrict
invasion by free-riders (e.g. Okasha, 2006).
2) Active selection: interactions may also be biased because
co-operators selectively choose to interact with other entities
that are more likely to be co-operators (conversely, they may
also selectively exclude or punish entities that are more likely
to be non-co-operators). For example: entities may direct their
cooperation towards others that carry particular markers that
are closely correlated with a pre-disposition towards cooper-
ation (the green beard effect, and some forms of kin selection
in which individuals can discriminate in favour of kin by using
cues that are correlated with relatedness (e.g. Keller and Ross,
1998; Mateo, 2003); entities that have the capacity to identify
other individuals and assess their behaviour may use
knowledge from repeated interactions to identify co-operators
and to selectively direct their cooperation towards them
(reciprocal altruism and some forms of indirect reciprocity
(e.g. Roberts, 2008; Trivers, 1971); entities may also identify
free-riders and decline to cooperate with them and/or punish
them (strong reciprocity and policing (e.g. Boyd et al., 2005;
Fehr and Gächter, 2002; Mouden et al., 2010)); and entities
may be constrained in ways that enable them to cooperate only
with other co-operators (autocatalytic sets of proteins and/or
RNA in which some members are highly speciﬁc catalysts
(e.g. Bagley and Farmer, 1991).
At every level of organization, living entities will tend to evolve
some forms of cooperation through the operation of these kinds of
processes. But if these are the only mechanisms that operate,
co-operators will not generally be able to capture the full beneﬁts
of their cooperation. These mechanisms do not include processes
that comprehensively prevent free-riders from undermining
cooperation (including preventing cheats that imitate co-operators
and therefore attract cooperation from selective co-operators, but
do not themselves contribute to cooperation).
In summary, these processes can help cooperation get started at
any level. But they are not responsible for the major steps in the
trajectory of evolution towards increasing integration. They are
incapable of producing the highly organized cooperative groups
which exhibit a complex division of labour and that eventually
become larger-scale entities at the next level of organization.
3.4. Comprehensive solutions to the cooperation problem
If the cooperation problem is to be overcome comprehensively,
free-riding must be prevented, and as far as possible, the beneﬁts
of cooperation must go to the co-operators that create them. If this
is to be achieved consistently and comprehensively in relation to a
group of entities, special arrangements that have three key
characteristics need to be in place (Stewart, 2000):
1) Power: the arrangements must have power over the entities in
the group (including over co-operators and free riders), and
the power to re-distribute the beneﬁts of cooperation amongst
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the ability to inﬂuence or constrain without being inﬂuenced
in return. If the arrangements could be inﬂuenced in return by
those they need to control, control would break down. For
example, free riders would be able to escape effective
suppression by the arrangements.
2) Evolvability: the arrangements must be evolvable/adaptable.
This enables the arrangements to explore the space of
possibilities for supressing free-riders and for supporting
beneﬁcial cooperation. It gives the arrangements the capacity
to optimize their use of power over entities, and to adapt their
control as free-riders and other non-co-operators evolve and
adapt to escape their control.
3) Alignment of interests: the evolutionary/adaptive interests of
the arrangements must be aligned with the overall evolution-
ary/adaptive interests of the group of entities that it manages.
Evolvability/adaptability per se is not enough. Unless interests
are aligned in this way, the arrangements will not necessarily
evolve/adapt in the direction needed to solve the cooperation
problem. They will not necessarily use their power and
evolvability to suppress free-riders and to support coopera-
tion.
When we consider cooperative groups at a scale we are familiar
with (i.e. at the scale of human organization), it is not difﬁcult to
identify arrangements of this kind that organize cooperative
groups. Three examples are:
1) The CEO of a corporation uses power over employees to
suppress free-riding and to reward actions that contribute
positively to the corporation.
2) The government of a modern state uses its power to establish
and operate a police force and legal system that punishes theft
and fraud, enforces contracts between economic actors, and
collects taxes that can be used to reward the provision of public
goods and other cooperative actions (e.g. national defence and
education). A democratic method of choosing the government
can go some way towards aligning the adaptive interests of the
government with the interests of the society as a whole. Strong
competition between societies can have a similar effect.
3) A farmer uses his power over plants and animals on his farm to
create conditions favourable to the reproduction and growth of
those species that contribute to the economic success of the
farm. And the farmer excludes or destroys species that
consume useful resources but have no economic value
themselves.
An understanding of these examples helps to identify cases in
which similar kinds of management arrangements emerged during
biological evolution to organize cooperative groups, including with
the origin of life itself. For example:
1) Self-reproducing RNA developed the power to manage a proto-
metabolism of simpler organic and inorganic molecules
(Dyson, 1985; Stewart, 1995, 1997a, 2000). The emergence of
proto-metabolisms began with cooperation amongst molecu-
lar species in the form of collective autocatalysis (Kauffman,
1993). Molecules cooperated with each other in autocatalytic
cycles and autocatalytic sets to promote each other's formation
and to thereby reproduce collectively. But the evolutionary
possibility space that could be explored by these cooperative
arrangements was very limited. In large part this was because
molecular species that could make a signiﬁcant contribution to
the effectiveness of a proto-metabolism were often not
themselves reproduced by any autocatalytic cycle or autocat-
alytic set in the proto-metabolism. These molecules could nottherefore capture the beneﬁts of their contribution. So despite
their usefulness to the proto-metabolism, they could not
persist in the proto-metabolism and could not be the target of
selection.
The emergence of RNA managers changed this radically. RNA
could use its catalytic capacity to support molecular species
and processes in the proto-metabolism that increased the
ﬁtness of the RNA and of the proto-cell as a whole, and to
supress processes that undermined it, including free-riders
(Stewart, 1997a, 2000).
The emergence of RNA as an evolvable manager whose
evolutionary interests were aligned with those of the proto-
metabolism it managed was arguably the most important step
in the origin of life. By overcoming the cooperation problem
within the proto-metabolism, it enabled the realization of an
enormous range of cooperative relationships within the
metabolism that could never have been explored in the
absence of an evolvable manager. It massively expanded
the possibility space that could be accessed, paving the way for
open-ended evolution, and moving signiﬁcantly beyond what
was possible through spontaneous chemical reactions and
processes. Without management, proto-metabolisms could
not generate the range of sustainable variation that is the
essential raw material of evolution. Without sustainable
variation to operate on, selection is incapable of producing
evolution. Unmanaged autocatalytic cycles and sets have very
limited capacity to evolve (Hordijk et al., 2012). Their
possibilities are circumscribed by the dictates of chemistry.
Although they can be self-reproducing, they fall on the abiotic
side of the divide between living and non-living. The
subsequent emergence of DNA as the manager of both RNA
and the proto-cell as a whole was a further important step in
the transition from chemistry to life.
2) A similar form of management was also critical in the
emergence of the eukaryote cell. The precursors of cellular
organelles such as mitochondria and chloroplasts were
bacteria that were engulfed by a larger cell (Margulis, 1981).
Because the larger cell had control over the environment of the
engulfed bacteria, it had the power to evolvably manage the
bacteria. It could constrain the bacteria to suppress competi-
tion amongst them that was against the interests of the cell,
promote actions that advantaged the cell as a whole, and
supress free riders (Maynard Smith and Szathmáry, 1995). It
could also constrain the evolvability of the engulfed bacteria to
reduce the possibility that they would escape control by the
larger cell (for example by transferring some of their DNA to
the chromosomes of the larger cell).
It is useful to classify the constraints applied by management
processes into two categories, although the categories represent
extremes on a continuum:
1) Prescriptive constraints: these specify more or less precisely
the particular outcomes that occur in the managed group. For
example, DNA determines the speciﬁc proteins that are
produced in a cell, including the quantities. And in a human
command economy, the central authority prescribes speciﬁc
economic outcomes, such as the nature and volume of the
consumer goods that are to be produced. Where constraints
are prescriptive, evolvability resides primarily in the manager,
not in the other entities in the group.
2) Enabling constraints: these achieve outcomes that are best for
the group without specifying what those outcomes are. They
accomplish this by aligning the interests of group members
with the interests of the group as a whole, and then letting the
entities adapt freely in pursuit of those aligned interests. So
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they adapt in the interests of the group. For example in a
human economic market, the system of governance constrains
theft and cheating on contracts, thereby ensuring that the only
way economic agents can pursue their own interests is by
engaging in fair market exchanges. In this way, enabling
constraints do not suppress or override the evolvability of
members of the group, and in fact harness it for the beneﬁt of
the group.
Of course, enabling constraints became more effective once
evolution produced entities that were highly evolvable and capable
of pursuing their own interests adaptively. The potential advan-
tages of having evolvable entities managed by enabling rather than
prescriptive constraints were demonstrated by the competitive
superiority of free market economies over command economies in
the 20th century. As this example illustrates, a key advantage of
enabling constraints is that they make use of the superior local
knowledge and the diverse perspectives of the members of the
group, rather than relying on the relatively limited knowledge and
perspective of the central manager (Hayek, 1948).
3.5. How management emerges – vertical self-organization
How do powerful managers emerge in populations in which
entities begin as equals, and do not have power over each other?
How do the evolutionary interests of managers come to be aligned
with those of the entities they manage, so that selection favours
the use of power to manage a group of entities in the interests of
the group as a whole?
It is not difﬁcult to identify scenarios in which selection would
favour entities that develop power over others. For example, their
power may enable them to monopolize resources (including access
to reproductive opportunities), or to predate others. But exercising
power in these ways does not necessarily align their evolutionary/
adaptive interests with those they have power over.
However, interests begin to be aligned to some extent if the
powerful entities discover ways in which they can harvest an on-
going stream of beneﬁts from those they control. Once this occurs,
they may do better if they use their power to help the group survive
and thrive, and thereby produce a larger stream of harvestable
beneﬁts, not just a once-off dividend. As we have seen, proto-
managers can substantially boost the productivity of a group by
solving the cooperation problem. More speciﬁcally, they can
increase the stream of harvestable beneﬁts by supporting co-
operators who would not otherwise persist in the group. Proto-
managers can also suppress free-riders who would otherwise take
some of the beneﬁts of cooperation without cooperating in return.
In some circumstances, proto-managers that solve the cooper-
ation problem and harvest an on-going stream of beneﬁts may be
able to do better than if they move between groups, exploiting
them as they go. Where this is the case, selection operating at the
level of individual proto-managers will tend to favour those that
remain with a group and use their power to increase the stream of
beneﬁts that they harvest from it (Stewart, 1995, 1997a, 2000).
To solve the cooperation problem comprehensively, a proto-
manager must have power over the group. It must be able to
operate on a sufﬁciently large scale to act across the group,
applying constraints to all its members. It must be able to stand
outside the dynamical interaction between group members and
not be dependent on involvement in those interactions. An entity
that is a normal member of a group will not have the capacity to
apply constraints across the group or to harvest resources from it.
This is readily seen in human groups: the only way a normal
member of a human group can take control of the group is toacquire power by, for example, using weapons or by increasing the
scale over which it operates by forming alliances with others.
Once such a proto-manager is able to harvest beneﬁts from its
group on an on-going basis, its interests will tend to be aligned
with the success of the group. Selection acting on managers will
also favour managers that use their power to align the evolutionary
interests of the members of the group with their own interests. If a
population of managed groups are in competition, selection will
favour managers that are best able to govern their group in ways
that enhance the success of the group as a whole.
The process of vertical self-organization embodied in this
scenario can account for the evolution of key steps in the trajectory
towards increasing integration outlined above (i.e. steps in which
individual entities that initially compete with each other have
come to be organized into cooperatives that eventually form
larger-scale entities at a higher level of organization). For example:
1) Some self-reproducing RNA molecules shifted from plundering
autocatalytic cycles and sets to governing metabolisms on an
on-going basis (Dyson, 1985; Stewart, 1995, 1997a, 2000).
2) Some large cells shifted from engulﬁng and feeding on some
forms of bacteria to managing and cultivating them within
themselves.
3) Some marauding bands of humans shifted from raping and
pillaging agricultural villages and communities to establishing
kingdoms that governed those communities.
However in modern human societies, the path to managed
organizations is much more straightforward. Human intelligence
is able to envisage somewhat the beneﬁts of managed organiza-
tions and see how they can be organized effectively. This enables
humans to construct managed organizations without the inter-
mediary sequence of steps.
3.6. Management and constraints
But not all of the major steps in which cooperative organizations
arise and form higher-level entities can be accounted for by the
emergence of this form of managed organization. In the kind of
managed organization that we have considered to this point, the
processes that manage the organization are physically located
outside the entities that are managed, and are larger in scale than
them. For example, DNA and RNA are external to the entities and
processes they manage, as is the governance of modern human
societies. But this does appear to be the case for the ﬁrst multicellular
organisms (there is no powerful entity that manages the cells and is
external to them), or for early human tribal societies (again there is
no powerful chief or other ruler that manages simple tribes (Boehm,
1999). Yet without external management, multicellular organisms
and early human tribes were able to achieve complex cooperative
organization, including division of labour. Apparently the coopera-
tion problem was solved in these instances to some signiﬁcant
extent. How was this realized?
Salthe (1985) demonstrates that constraints that can control a
dynamic of interacting entities may arise in either of two ways:
1) Upper-level constraints: these arise external to the dynamic of
entities. They can inﬂuence the dynamic without being
inﬂuenced in return. This is often because they are larger in
scale than the entities they constrain, and are constituted by
processes that operate signiﬁcantly more slowly than the
interactions in the dynamic. Examples of abiotic upper-level
constraints that act on a population of entities include features
of the environment that are relatively unchanging from the
perspective of the interacting entities, such as large-scale
physical structure in the environment. The external managers
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constraints. It is worth emphasizing here that they are often
constituted by processes rather than entities.
2) Lower-level constraints: these arise within the entities
themselves. These constraints are relatively ﬁxed, internal
features of the interacting entities that can inﬂuence how
entities behave in interactions, but are not inﬂuenced in
return. In effect, they hardwire entities. Examples of lower
level constraints in living entities include genetic elements,
and internalized norms, customs and beliefs.
3.7. Internal distributed management
However it is not immediately obvious how lower-level
constraints that are internal to each entity could manage a group
of entities to overcome the cooperation problem. These constraints
have the power to constrain an entity that contains them, but how
can this power operate across a group of entities?
It can do so if a suitable cluster of constraints are reproduced in
each of the entities in the group. Such a cluster of constraints
would constitute an internal distributed manager that is capable of
acting and coordinating across the group, just as an external
manager can. The cluster of constraints could, for example, pre-
dispose entities that contain it to: reciprocate in cooperative
exchanges; refrain from free-riding; collectively punish or kill any
non-co-operator members of the group who do not contain the
cluster of constraints (and who therefore are not constrained to
cooperate); and prevent any free-riders from joining the group and
exploiting it (Stewart, 1995, 1997a, 2000).
Importantly, the evolutionary interests of a distributed internal
manager tend to be aligned with the interests of the group that it
manages. The manager will capture the beneﬁts of any cooperative
activities within the group, because it exists in each of the
members of the group. Selection will therefore favour any variant
internal manager that constrains the members of the group in ways
that promote beneﬁcial cooperation. As a manager evolves, it can
be expected to develop a co-adapted assemblage of constraints
that organizes the group into a cooperative whole. The manager
itself will evolve and operate as a whole. In principle, the evolution
of such a manager in gene-based organisms can be reduced to kin
selection and related processes. However, the emergence of the
manager and the system of evolvable constraints that constitute it
can only be properly understood as a co-evolving whole. A fully-
developed manager will solve the cooperation problem, and
complex cooperative organization will self-organize.
Examples include:
1) The transition from independent eukaryote cells to multicel-
lular organisms was organized by the emergence of internal,
distributed genetic managers that were reproduced in each
cell.
2) Early human tribes were organized in the main by internal
managers comprising co-adapted sets of norms, mores and
inculcated beliefs (to an extent some current human groups
such as the hutterites continue to be organized in this way
(Sober and Wilson, 1998)).
3) Insect societies are organized by genetic internal managers
reproduced in members of the society.
3.8. How the global trajectory is driven and shaped
Now that we have identiﬁed the particular forms of organiza-
tion that can comprehensively overcome the cooperation problem,
we are in a position to explain the global trajectory towards
increasing integration and cooperation. We can identify the causal
processes that drive and shape it.The trajectory is propelled by the potential ﬁtness and utility of
cooperative organization. Cooperative groups have the potential to
out-compete isolated individuals. Selection will favour effective
cooperation, provided it is available for selection.
Importantly, the potential advantages of cooperation are
universal—they apply for all living processes in all environments.
Whatever the circumstances, co-operators are potentially superior.
The potential beneﬁts of cooperation therefore have the capacity to
drive a global trend in the evolution of life.
This conclusion is not negated by the fact that gene-based
natural selection can drive only local adaptation. Since the beneﬁts
of cooperation apply both locally and universally, an organism that
exploits the beneﬁts of cooperation can achieve local evolutionary
advantage while also participating in a global trend.
But the potential of cooperation can be realized only to the
extent that the cooperation problem is overcome. Unless the
cooperation problem is solved, complex cooperative organization
will not arise. It will not come into existence while individual
entities fail to capture sufﬁcient of the beneﬁts of their
cooperation. Selection at the group level, no matter how powerful,
cannot call it into existence.
We have seen that evolvable management, whether external or
internal, can overcome the cooperation problem. It can manage a
group of entities to ensure that beneﬁcial cooperation can be
sustained within the group and can therefore be the target of
selection. This massively expands the possibility space that can be
explored as the group evolves.
Where a powerful manager is able to harvest an on-going
stream of beneﬁts from the group it manages, it will be able to
capture the beneﬁts of any management that increases the
productivity of the group. It will therefore be able to advance its
own evolutionary/adaptive interests by promoting cooperation
within the managed group. If managed groups compete with each
other, and if a manager is less successful if it lives independently of
its group, the most effective way in which it will be able to advance
its interests will be to advance those of the managed group. In
these circumstances the manager's evolutionary/adaptive inter-
ests will tend to be aligned with those of the managed group as a
whole (Stewart, 1997a, 2000).
Because the manager's evolutionary/adaptive interests will
tend to be aligned with those of the group, selection acting on the
manager will favour management which aligns the interests of the
entities it manages with the interests of the group. As a result, all
the members of the group, manager and managed entities alike,
will adapt cooperatively to serve the group as a whole. Members of
the group will be favoured by selection only insofar as they serve
the adaptive interests of the group as a whole. As a consequence,
the group will increasingly come to be organized and adapted to
function as an entity in its own right. Selection operating at the
level of the manager and at the level of individual entities will
favour entiﬁcation of the group. The emerging entity will come to
be comprised of parts that function interdependently to ensure the
survival and reproduction of the whole. Entity-level adaptations
will be favoured and shaped by selection at the individual level.
The entity will increasingly operate as an integrated functional
unit, and will come to act on the world as a coherent whole, as do
for example, bacteria, eukaryote cells, and multicellular organisms
(Stewart, 1997a, 2000).
But even though managers may solve the cooperation problem
for the groups they organize, this simply exports the cooperation
problem to a higher level and to a larger scale. Managers can only
solve the cooperation problem at the scale over which they can
exercise power. At this scale they can suppress free-riding and
support co-operators within the group they manage. But the
cooperative groups that they organize at this scale will compete
with each other, and the cooperation problem will therefore apply
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this larger scale, and will not be available for selection to operate
on. The full beneﬁts of cooperation between groups will be
unrealized. These unrealized beneﬁts will drive the emergence and
evolution of new managers that can capture sufﬁcient of the
beneﬁts by organizing groups into larger-scale cooperatives. In this
way, the trajectory of evolution will be driven towards further
cooperative integration that is able to realize some of the beneﬁts
of cooperation at larger-scales (Stewart, 1997b, 2000).
This process repeats itself at larger scales and higher levels,
giving rise to the step-wise nature of the trajectory towards
increasing integration. At each step in this trajectory, the scale of
cooperative organization increases. As the trajectory unfolds, the
potential beneﬁts of cooperation are progressively realized
through the actual integration of living processes into larger-scale
organizations. At each step, the emergence of management greatly
expands evolutionary possibility space.
As we have seen, the beneﬁts of cooperation exist interspeciﬁ-
cally as well as intraspeciﬁcally. The cooperation problem stands in
the way of the realization of the beneﬁts. These unrealized beneﬁts
provide opportunities for suitable managers to emerge and
manage the integration of multi-specie systems into larger-scale
cooperative entities. Integration is not limited to members of the
same species and will progressively include the integration of all
living processes. Examples of steps in this process include the
integration of prokaryotes into the eukaryote cell, and the
agriculture practised by various species of ants, termites and
beetles (Mueller et al., 2005)
The potential beneﬁts of cooperation can be expected to
continue to drive the step-wise process of integration until it
reaches a natural limit. This limit is the scale of the planet. Once a
global cooperative organization emerges that integrates the living
processes of the globe, it will not be in competition with other
entities on the planet. It will not be subject to a cooperation
problem at the level of the globe.
However, while ever cooperative organizations of the largest-
scale are smaller than the planet, they will constitute a population
of organizations that compete with each other. This will produce
the cooperation problem. Organizations that act cooperatively
towards others will tend to be out-competed. This dynamic is
currently evident at the level of nation states. Global warming and
international war are both manifestations of the cooperation
problem. The existence of the cooperation problem at this level
means that potential beneﬁts can be realized through the
emergence of global management (including global governance).
Global management has the potential to overcome the cooperation
problem at the level of nation states.
Effective global management would not only suppress destruc-
tive competition between nations. Ultimately it would also have the
potential to realize the beneﬁts of integrating all lower level entities
into the global organization, including by supporting entities that
contribute positively to the global organization. A global manager
that is sufﬁciently powerful and evolvable has the potential to
control a hierarchy of management that integrates the living and
non-living processes of the planet into a cooperative and uniﬁed
global entity (for more detailed discussion, see Stewart, 2000).
4. Testing the directionality hypothesis
4.1. The apparent absence of directional change in bacteria and other
lineages
As discussed in Section 1, the central challenge confronting any
claim for a driven, global trend in evolution is that many lineages
do not appear to show any evidence of such a trend for long periods
of evolutionary time. How is this challenge met by the claim thatliving processes tend to be progressively integrated into coopera-
tive organizations of larger and larger scale as evolution unfolds?
The apparent absence of cooperative integration amongst many
lineages of organisms does not appear to be due to a lack of
potential beneﬁts that could ﬂow from their integration. The
beneﬁts of cooperation are just as available to these lineages as
they are to the lineages that have cooperated successfully.
Potentially, any given population of organisms could exploit its
resources more effectively if the population was coordinated and
organized cooperatively. But these potentials would not be able to
be realized until the emergence of appropriate forms of manage-
ment that can exploit the beneﬁts of cooperation cost/effectively.
And this might not occur for long periods – effective management
requires complex arrangements that cannot be expected to evolve
easily. Nor would we expect lineages that fail to exploit
the potential beneﬁts of cooperation to be always replaced by
those that have. This is because they may be adapted to their niches
by specializations that outweigh any ﬁtness advantages that might
accrue to co-operators that are not specialized. For example, the
small size of many species of bacteria gives them a signiﬁcant
advantage over eukaryote cells and multicellular organisms in
many niches.
But the case for an overall driven trend towards increasing
integration does not have to rely on these largely theoretical
arguments. It is evident that many previously ‘trend-less’ lineages
are now beginning to be integrated into larger-scale cooperatives,
and this process can be expected to continue. This integration has
been made possible by the emergence of organisms that are highly
evolvable (intelligent), powerful and able to coordinate actions
over much larger scales than bacteria and other organisms—i.e. due
to the emergence of humans and cooperative organizations of
humans. Humans are beginning to develop the technology and
know-how to manage other organisms and integrate them into
larger-scale human-dominated organizations for human ends.
Humanity is starting to exploit the potential beneﬁts of coopera-
tion that so far have been unrealized for extended periods by many
other lineages.
As well as managing particular species for human purposes,
humanity is also beginning to actively manage entire ecosystems
and the large-scale ecological cycles and processes that are
essential for human survival and ﬂourishing. Bacteria and other
organisms play a critically important role in these processes.
Human disruption of ecological systems will increasingly demand
active management of ecosystems and the organisms that
comprise them. Current attempts to regulate the amount of
carbon dioxide in the atmosphere are just a small, ﬁrst step in this
direction.
These trends toward the integration of bacteria and other
organisms into large-scale cooperative organization can be
expected to continue apace. The potential beneﬁts of cooperation
at the global level will incentivize human systems to increasingly
manage the energy, matter, living processes and technology of the
planet into a cooperative organization on the scale of the planet.
From the perspective of this global organization, the planet's
ecosystems and bio-geo-chemical cycles will constitute impor-
tant parts of its metabolism that are managed by human systems
in the interests of the organization (just as DNA manages the
metabolic processes within a cell). The beneﬁts of cooperation at
the global level will drive entiﬁcation of the global organization,
including the management of all living processes into a symbiotic
community that will be like an organism on the scale of the
planet. As it has at every other level of organization, entiﬁcation
can be expected to eventually produce an entity that is able to act
coherently as a whole, with goals and intelligence of its own.
Heylighen (2012) argues that the intelligence of this emerging
global entity will be constituted by humans and artiﬁcial
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global entity becomes aware of the nature of the large-scale
evolutionary processes that have formed it and that will
determine its future success, it will manage the living and
non-living processes of the planet to create the best-possible
platform for its further development and evolution (Stewart,
2010).
4.2. Predictions
The ultimate test for a theory is whether it can account for
phenomena that are hitherto unexplained, and whether it can
make surprising predictions that prove to be accurate. Many
detailed predictions and explanations can be derived from the
model developed here. Perhaps the most signiﬁcant of these is that
the theory:
1) Accounts for the nested-hierarchical structure of living
processes, including in relation to human organization.
2) Hypothesises that each level in these nested hierarchies arose
through the emergence of external management or internal
distributed management (or a combination), and predicts that
this will be evident in the way each of these levels is organized
(i.e. each level will continue to include forms of organization
that originally emerged as internal or external managers).
3) Predicts and explains the current rapid integration of living
processes into human organizations, and predicts that this will
continue and accelerate as part of the eventual emergence of a
global entity that integrates the living processes, matter,
energy and technology of the planet, and undergoes an
entiﬁcation process in its own right.
4) Predicts that the further integration of humanity into a global
entity will be driven by the potential beneﬁts of overcoming
the cooperation problem on a planetary scale. Humanity will
increasingly encounter challenges such as climate change and
war that demand global coordination because they cannot be
adequately solved by nation states or other smaller-
scale entities acting alone (of course, the forces that drive
the trajectory of evolution do not provide any absolute
guarantee that human civilization will respond effectively to
these challenges and survive them).
5. Conclusion
If we stand back from the history of life on Earth so that we can
see past, present and future evolution as a whole, and if we take
into account the large-scale processes that have begun to emerge
recently and that are likely to continue strongly into the future, an
overall direction is unmistakable. Evolution has been heading
towards the emergence of a coordinated and integrated global
entity.
It is difﬁcult to discern the overall direction of evolution
without this wider perspective. It is like looking at a developing
chicken embryo, and focusing closely on some of the speciﬁc
processes within the embryo for short periods of time. In many
cases, it would not be evident that the particular processes are
headed anywhere in particular. It is only when all the processes of
the developing embryo are considered as an integrated whole over
a longer time frame, that it becomes abundantly clear that there is
an overall trajectory to the developing embryo.
When we stand back from the evolutionary process on this
planet and consider it as a coherent whole, we see that there are
two great trends within evolution. One is towards diversiﬁcation.
The other is towards integration and cooperation. As we have seen
in some detail, both trends are driven by selection processes that
are consistent with mainstream evolutionary theory.When living processes ﬁrst emerged, they were very small in
scale and restricted to speciﬁc environmental conditions. From
there life spread, specializing and diversifying into other environ-
ments, exploiting an increasing variety of free energy and other
resources. Some living processes discovered ways to cooperate and
to coordinate their activities, signiﬁcantly enhancing their
effectiveness in particular environments. These larger-scale
cooperatives in turn spread and diversiﬁed. But because of limits
to their ability to exploit the beneﬁts of cooperation, they were not
able to exploit all niches more effectively than their predecessors,
and therefore did not replace them entirely.
Some of these larger-scale cooperatives in turn discovered ways
to coordinate and cooperate, thereby further increasing their
effectiveness. This enabled them to spread and diversify further
across the face of the planet. Some of these larger-scale entities
developed the power and evolvability to integrate other organisms
into their organizations, overcoming impediments that prevented
the organisms from exploiting the beneﬁts of cooperation on their
own. Repetitions of these evolutionary integrations produced
cooperative organizations of greater and greater scale, and now
seem highly likely to lead to the emergence of a cooperative
organization on the scale of the planet. Such a global organization
seems likely to eventually integrate the diversiﬁed and specialized
living processes of the planet into a coherent whole, enabling the
emerging global entity to exploit energy and other resources from
diverse environments.
It can be seen at this point that the diversiﬁcation and
specialization that occurred at lower levels is an integral part of
this directional process. This diversiﬁcation enabled the widest
range of resources to be exploited by life. The subsequent
integration of these diverse smaller-scale living processes into
an emerging global entity will enable the entity to exploit the
widest possible range of resources across the varied circumstances
of the planet.
As the global entity emerges, it can be expected to increasingly
manage the living processes, energy, matter and technology of
the entire planet into a coordinated whole. As it develops, it will
optimize all the processes onwhich it depends (including large-scale
ecological systems) in order to create the most effective platform for
its future evolution. Of course, this is not likely to be the end of the
evolutionary trajectory. The trajectory is likely to have unfolded
elsewhere (although the details are likely to be different), and similar
diversiﬁcationsandintegrationsare therefore likely to be repeatedat
larger and larger scales across space and time. The further unfolding
of this trajectory and its profound implications for humanity are
considered by Stewart (2010).
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